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Abstract
In the operations research literature, the queue joining probability is monotonic decreasing in the queue
length; the longer the queue, the fewer consumers join. Recent academic and empirical evidence indicates
that queue-joining probabilities may not always be decreasing in the queue length. We provide a simple
explanation for these nonmonotonic queue-joining strategies by relaxing the informational assumptions in
Naor's model. Instead of imposing that the expected service time and service value are common knowledge,
we assume that they are unknown to consumers, but positively correlated. Under such informational
assumptions, the posterior expected waiting cost and service value increase in the observed queue length. As a
consequence, we show that queue-joining equilibria may emerge for which the joining probability increases
locally in the queue length. We refer to these as “sputtering equilibria.” We discuss when and why such
sputtering equilibria exist for discrete as well as continuously distributed priors on the expected service time
(with positively correlated service value).
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Abstract
We study a single queue joining equilibrium when there is uncertainty in the consumers’
minds about the service rate and value. Without such uncertainty, the joining equilibria are
characterized by means of a single threshold queue length above which consumers do not join
(Naor, 1969). We show that in the presence of such uncertainty, the equilibrium joining strategy
is not fully characterized by a single threshold. A “sputtering equilibrium” might exist. In
the sputtering equilibrium, the queue length generally remains within a threshold, but reaches
another, strictly higher, threshold, depending on the outcome of the randomized decision of the
consumer arriving at the lower threshold. We discuss when and why sputtering equilibria exist.
Keywords: Queueing games, Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Threshold policies.
1. Introduction
This note contributes to the stream of research on consumer queue joining behavior. Equilibrium
queue joining behavior have been examined beginning with seminal work by Naor (1969). The
reader is referred to Hassin and Haviv (2003) for an excellent overview. The established equilibrium
result is as follows: When there are waiting costs, the consumers follow a threshold strategy. In
other words, they join the queue if the length of the queue is below a threshold. Above the
threshold, congestion effects dominate any value from service and consumers balk from the service.
In the operations research literature, such negative externalities are extensively studied in a queuing
context.
In this note, we relax two key assumptions in Naor’s classical queue joining game: the observ-
ability of the service rates and their service values. We do so by modeling the service rate and
value as a random variable whose realization is not observed by the consumers.
We demonstrate that unobservable service value and service rate may result in a “sputtering”
equilibrium, where the queue length at the server generally resides within a lower threshold, but
may probabilistically break through to a strictly higher threshold value, depending on the choice
of the consumer who mixes between joining and balking at that particular state. This sputtering
equilibrium fundamentally expands on the threshold equilibria seen in queues with rational decision-
making consumers. A sputtering equilibrium may emerge when service value and service rate are
negatively correlated. Thus, we find that the focus on simple threshold policies in queuing games
with uncertainty about the service rate and value might be restrictive.
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Non-threshold joining strategies have been identified in queuing games with priorities (Hassin
and Haviv, 1996). Recent papers including Debo et al. (2010) and Veeraraghavan and Debo
(2010) have been studying informational externalities associated with queue joining decisions under
waiting costs. In both papers, non-threshold queue joining strategies emerge in queuing games
with heterogeneously informed consumers. In our note, just as in Naor’s model, consumers are
homogenous and there are no priorities. Hence, we show that the non-threshold queue joining
behavior emerges even in the canonical Naor (1969) model when the service rates and service
values are not observable and negatively correlated. Thus, our analysis fundamentally expands on
the queueing games literature with known service rates and values. Our analysis also suggests that
in practice queue joining distributions cannot be generated by single threshold consumer joining
strategies in the environments that we characterized. This may lead to further theoretical and
empirical exploration.
2. Model
Consumers arrive sequentially to the server according to a Poisson process with parameter Λ. If
the arriving consumers cannot be immediately served, they wait and form a queue. The queue
discipline is first-come, first-served (FCFS). All consumers incur a disutility of c > 0 per unit time
while waiting to complete the service.
The server belongs to one of the two types, ω ∈ {h, `}. The utility that a consumer obtains
from the server of type ω is vω, with vh ≥ v`. The consumer’s prior about the server’s type is
Pr(ω = h) = p. We address the server with service value vh as the high-type or the high-quality
server. (Thus the low-quality server has v = v`.)
The service time of both types ω ∈ {`, h} is exponentially distributed. There are two types of
processes, a slow process and a fast process. The mean service time of the slow (fast) process is
1/µ (1/µ) (i.e., µ < µ). As we have two server types and two types of service processes, we analyze
four situations. For notational ease, we introduce µ .= (µh, µ`). Specifically, we use µff = (µ, µ),
µss = (µ, µ), µsf = (µ, µ) and µfs = (µ, µ) as shorthand notations for the four situations. For any
vector µσ, with σ ∈ {ss, ff, sf, fs}, the first letter refers to the service speed of the high-quality
service (slow or fast), while the second letter refers to the speed of the low quality service (slow
or fast). For instance, µsf = (µ, µ) corresponds to the situation when the high-quality server has
slow service speed, and the low quality server has fast service speed. The consumer knows σ, but,
does not know the realization of the server’s type.
The model parameters are (Λ, vh, v`, µ, µ). Throughout this note, we assume that the value
generated per unit of time by the high-quality server is always higher than that low-quality server’s.
That is, vhµ > v`µ.
The game proceeds as follows. First, Nature determines the server’s type (with probability p,
ω = h). The server’s type determines the service value (vω) and speed (µω). Then, consumers
arrive and observe the queue length, n, based on which they decide whether to join the queue or
balk. The consumers maximize their expected net utility (i.e. service value minus the expected
2
waiting costs), conditional on their available information.
The Consumer Strategies and Beliefs: All consumers decide the probability of joining the ser-
vice after observing the queue length n ≥ 0. We denote this probability by α(n). The consumer’s
updated belief that the type of the server is high after observing a queue of length n is denoted by
γ(n). In short, α = (α(0), α(1), α(2), . . .) and γ= (γ(0), γ(1), γ(2), . . .) denote the consumer’s join-
ing strategy and the consumer’s updated belief respectively. We need to determine the equilibrium
strategies of all consumers: α∗ and γ∗. We specify the equilibrium conditions next.
The Equilibrium Conditions: Consider a randomly arriving consumer. Suppose all other con-
sumers are joining according to some strategy α. The consumer’s expected utility of joining the
queue, denoted by u (n,γ), is a function of the queue length upon arrival, n, his/her belief about
the server’s type, γ. We now define:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium). The strategies α∗, and beliefs γ∗ form a Markov Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (Maskin and Tirole 2001) if:
(i)-the consumers are rational: for each n ∈ N,
α∗ (n) ∈ arg max
α′∈[0,1]
α′ × u (n,γ∗) . (1)
(ii)-beliefs are consistent: The belief γ∗ (n) satisfies Bayes’ rule on all queue lengths that are reached
with strictly positive probability in the long run under the strategy α∗.1
The condition (i) of Definition 1 is referred to as the rationality condition for the consumers.
The condition (ii) of Definition 1 is referred to as the consistency condition of the beliefs. Using
the conditions, we can now analyze the queue joining equilibrium.
3. Analysis of Queue Joining Equilibrium
A consumer’s utility can be written as,
u (n,γ) = γ (n) vh + (1− γ (n)) v` − c(n+ 1) (γ (n) /µh + (1− γ (n))/µ`) . (2)
With Equation (2), we can rewrite condition (i) of Definition 1 for consumers in terms of the
likelihood ratio of the updated probability that the service is of high quality when a consumer
observes queue length n (to updated probability that the service is of low quality). Now, instead
of the updated belief, γ (n), it will be convenient to introduce the likelihood ratio, l (n), satisfying:
γ (n) / (1− γ (n)) = l0 × l (n), where l0 = p/ (1− p). In other words, we decompose γ (n) into
the consumer’s prior likelihood (that the server is of high quality), l0, and the likelihood ratio
of observing n consumers upon arrival, l (n). Then, with Equation (2), we obtain the following
1When a queue length is not reached with positive probability, the belief is irrelevant, as well as the action at that
queue length.
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condition to make a consumer join a queue of length n:
u (n,γ) > 0⇔ l (n) > L (n) , where L (n) .= 1
l0
−v` + c(n+ 1) 1µ`
vh − c(n+ 1) 1µh
. (3)
L can be interpreted as the minimum likelihood ratio that is required to make a consumer join a
queue of length n. The rationality condition (i) of Definition 1 determines α (n) for any n, which
is 1 (0) when l (n) > L (n) (l (n) < L (n)).
Now, we discuss condition (ii) of Definition 1. This condition needs to be imposed on l(n). To
that end, let pi(n,α, µ) be the long run probability that n consumers are in the system when the
consumer strategy is α and the server’s service rate is µ. For a given service rate and consumer
joining strategy, the stochastic process that describes the queue length is a birth and death process,
which allows us to characterize the long-run probability distribution. (See Ross 1996, pp. 254.)
Suppose consumers follow the strategy profile α. Then, for both server types ω ∈ {h, `}, the
stationary probability of observing a queue of length n, pi (n,α, µ), is:
pi (n,α, µ) = pi (0,α, µ)
n−1∏
j=0
α(j)Λ
µ
where pi (0,α, µ) =
1 + ∞∑
n=1
n−1∏
j=0
α(j)Λ
µ
−1 . (4)
With the PASTA property (Wolff, 1982), pi (n,α, µ), is also the probability that a randomly
arriving consumer observes n consumers in the system. The posterior probability that the server’s
quality is high after observing a queue length of n is ppi(n,α,µh)ppi(n,α,µh)+(1−p)pi(n,α,µ`) . The posterior likeli-
hood is then l0 × pi(n,α,µh)pi(n,α,µ`) . The consistency condition of Definition 1(ii) becomes: l (n) =
pi(n,α,µh)
pi(n,α,µ`)
for all queue lengths that are reached with positive probability in equilibrium.2 With Equation
(4), notice that pi(n,α,µh)pi(n,α,µ`) becomes equal to
pi(0,α,µh)
pi(0,α,µ`)
( µ`µh )
n. As the first factor is equal to l(0), the
consistency condition Definition 1(ii) becomes:
l (0) =
pi (0,α, µh)
pi (0,α, µ`)
and l (n) = l (0)
(
µ`
µh
)n
for n ≥ 1. (5)
We exploit this structure to obtain the conditions for the equilibrium: instead of finding a fixed
point α and γ that satisfies Definition 1(i) and (ii), we reduce the equilibrium characterization
of Definition 1(i-ii) to a single-dimensional fixed point characterization in Proposition 1. This
is because the likelihood ratio at the empty queue, l(0), along with Equation (5) immediately
determines l(n) for any n ≥ 1. With Equation (3), the rational actions can be immediately
determined by comparing l(n) with L(n). Thus, the only unknown is l(0).
In the following Proposition, we characterize the equilibrium by letting ϕ be a conjecture of the
equilibrium l(0). For any conjecture ϕ of l(0), Equation (5) provides a conjecture of l(n), which
determines a rational strategy (i.e. join iff l (n) > L (n), or randomize when l (n) = L (n), see
Equation (3)). This rational structure is an equilibrium if the likelihood ratio it induces at the
2l(n) is indeterminate whenever pi(n, α, µh) and pi(n, α, µ`) are both zero.
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empty queue (obtained from Equation 4) is equal to ϕ. We refer to this fixed point as ϕˆ. In that
case, with ϕˆ, a strategy profile, α∗, that is rational (Definition 1(i) is satisfied) and a corresponding
belief, γ∗, that is consistent (Definition 1(ii) is satisfied for all n ≥ 0) is constructed as described
below:
Proposition 1. Let nˆ = (nˆ0, αˆ0, nˆ1) where nˆ0 ∈ N, αˆ0 ∈ [0, 1) and nˆ1 ∈ N (nˆ1 > nˆ0) and
Ψ(nˆ) =
∑nˆ0
k=0
[
Λ
µ`
]k
+ αˆ0
∑nˆ1
k=nˆ0+1
[
Λ
µ`
]k
∑nˆ0
k=0
[
Λ
µh
]k
+ αˆ0
∑nˆ1
k=nˆ0+1
[
Λ
µh
]k , (6)
then,
(i) there exists a ‘classical’ threshold equilibrium (pure or mixed if) for some ϕˆ ∈ R+, and nˆ1 =
nˆ0 + 1 the following conditions are satisfied:
ϕˆ = Ψ(nˆ0, αˆ0, nˆ0 + 1) (7)
and  ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)n ≥ L (n) , for 0 ≤ n < nˆ0,
ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)n
< L (n) , for n ≥ nˆ0.
(8)
where the first inequality is binding when α0 > 0.
(ii) there exists a non-threshold equilibrium if for some ϕˆ ∈ R+, and nˆ1 > nˆ0 + 1 the following
conditions are satisfied: the condition of Equation (7) and
ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)n
> L (n) , for 0 ≤ n < nˆ0 (if 0 < nˆ0),
ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)nˆ0
= L (nˆ0) , for n = nˆ0,
ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)n
> L (n) , for nˆ0 < n < nˆ1,
ϕˆ
(
µ`
µh
)n
< L (n) , for n ≥ nˆ1.
(9)
Proposition 1(i) provides conditions for a pure or mixed strategy consumer equilibria: When
αˆ0 = 0, a pure strategy equilibrium exists in which consumers join at any queue length that
is strictly less than the threshold nˆ0, and balk from queues equal to or longer than nˆ0. When
αˆ0 > 0, and nˆ1 = nˆ0 + 1, consumers join at any queue length that is strictly less than the
threshold nˆ0, join with probability αˆ0 at the queue length nˆ0, otherwise, they balk. In this case,
α∗ = (1, 1, . . . , αˆ0, 0, 0, . . .), where αˆ0 is on the nˆ0 + 1st position. γ∗ follows immediately from the
long run probability distributions that are characterized by Equation (4). This is an extension of a
pure strategy equilibrium, as discussed in Hassin and Haviv (2003), p. 7-8. We refer to this equilib-
rium simply as the classical threshold equilibrium. Proposition 1(ii) indicates that this classical equi-
librium strategy is not always an equilibrium. When nˆ1 > nˆ0+1, Proposition 1(ii) identifies a non-
threshold equilibrium with mixing (with probability αˆ0) at some queue length (nˆ0), while joining
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at longer queues and balking at queue length nˆ1. In this case, α∗ = (1, 1, . . . , αˆ0, 1, . . . , 1, 0, 0, . . .),
where αˆ0 is on the (nˆ0+1)-st position and the last 1 is at the (nˆ1+1)-st position. Again, γ∗ follows
immediately from the long run probability distributions.
In the following subsections, we elaborate further the intuition behind Proposition 1. To that
end, we introduce ν (ϕ), which is the set of solutions to the ϕ (µ`/µh)
ν = L (ν). This is the
continuous version of Equation (8), determining nˆ0. Define now nˆ (ϕ)
.= bmin ν (ϕ)c. nˆ (ϕ) is the
lowest queue length at which the consumer has negative expected utility, and hence balks when the
conjecture of the likelihood ratio at the empty queue is ϕ.
Keeping all else equal, a larger ϕ means a higher likelihood ratio at the empty queue. Of course
only the equilibrium value of ϕ will be the equilibrium likelihood ratio. By means of Equation
(8), a higher likelihood ratio at every queue length. Therefore, the balking threshold nˆ (ϕ) is
non-decreasing in ϕ. Now, define:
Φ(nˆ) .= Ψ((nˆ, 0, ·)) , (10)
i.e. the likelihood ratio at the empty queue when the consumer joining strategy is a pure threshold
strategy determined by balking at nˆ. As nˆ (ϕ) ∈ N, the function Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) is a (discontinuous)
staircase function in ϕ. In the following subsections, Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) will be discussed further. We also
provide intuition for the equilibrium structure of Proposition 1.
3.1 Classical threshold equilibrium at nˆ0 with αˆ0 = 0
A pure strategy threshold joining equilibrium (with αˆ0 = 0) exists if there is a solution, ϕˆ, to:
ϕ = Φ(nˆ (ϕ)). (11)
In words, if the conjecture about the likelihood ratio at the empty queue, ϕˆ, leads to a rational
joining strategy with threshold nˆ0 = nˆ (ϕˆ), which in turn leads to a likelihood ratio at the empty
queue, Φ(nˆ0) that is consistent with (i.e. equal to) ϕˆ, then the two equilibrium conditions of
Definition 1(i) and (ii) are satisfied. nˆ1 is irrelevant as it is reached with zero probability.
Assume now that at one of the discontinuous points of nˆ (ϕ), say, ϕˆ, the consumers’ threshold
changes from nˆ0 to nˆ1 and causes the likelihood ratio induced by the threshold to change from a
level strictly below (or above) ϕˆ to a level strictly above (or below) ϕˆ. Formally, there exists a ϕˆ
such that nˆ (ϕˆ− ²) = nˆ0 and nˆ (ϕˆ+ ²) = nˆ1 for which Φ (nˆ0) < Φ (nˆ1) (or: Φ (nˆ0) > Φ (nˆ1)). When
ϕˆ ∈ (Φ (nˆ0) ,Φ (nˆ1)) (or: ϕˆ ∈ (Φ (nˆ1) ,Φ(nˆ0))), ϕˆ cannot characterize an pure strategy equilibrium.
In that case, we can construct a consumer joining equilibrium involving mixing at nˆ0, i.e. α0 > 0.
We consider two cases involving mixing in the following two subsections. In the first case,
we analyze nˆ1 = nˆ0 + 1. This corresponds with a classical threshold joining equilibrium with
randomization. In the second case, nˆ1 > nˆ0+1. We will denote the latter as ‘sputtering’ equilibrium,
because at nˆ0 the queue ‘sputters’ before increasing to nˆ1 due to the mixing probability αˆ0 at nˆ0.
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Figure 1: Determination of equilibrium for µ = µsf ; Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) = φ (left panel) and the Updated
Service Value, γˆ(n)vh+(1−γˆ(n))v`, vs. the Updated Waiting Cost, γˆ(n)c(n+1)/µh+(1−γˆ(n))c(n+
1)/µ` (right panel). Demonstration of the sputtering equilibrium with randomization at n = 6 and
a balking threshold at n = 40.
3.2 Classical threshold equilibrium at nˆ0 with randomization αˆ0 > 0 and nˆ1 =
nˆ0 + 1
When nˆ1 = nˆ0 + 1, it is easy to see from the definitions of Equations (6) and (10) that:
Ψ ((nˆ0, 0, nˆ0 + 1)) = Φ (nˆ0) and Ψ ((nˆ0, 1, nˆ0 + 1)) = Φ (nˆ0 + 1). Then, by continuity of Ψ ((nˆ0, α, nˆ0 + 1))
in α, any likelihood ratio in [Φ (nˆ0) ,Φ(nˆ0 + 1)] is achieved with a mixed strategy, α ∈ [0, 1] at nˆ0.
Thus, there exists an equilibrium with mixing at nˆ0 such that the likelihood ratio of that strategy
is equal to ϕˆ. Both conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 are satisfied. It follows that a classical
mixed strategy extension of a pure strategy threshold (Hassin and Haviv, 2003) is an equilibrium;
i.e. all consumers join queues that are strictly shorter than nˆ0, randomize with probability αˆ0 at a
queue of length nˆ0, and balk at queues that are longer than or equal to nˆ0 + 1.
3.3 Non-threshold or ‘Sputtering’ equilibrium with αˆ0 > 0 and nˆ1 > nˆ0 + 1
When nˆ1 > nˆ0 + 1, an extension of a pure threshold strategy with mixing with probability α0
at the threshold nˆ0 and balking at nˆ0 + 1 cannot cover any likelihood ratio in [Φ (nˆ0) ,Φ(nˆ1)]
when Φ (nˆ0 + 1) < Φ(nˆ1) and ϕˆ ∈ (Φ (nˆ0 + 1) ,Φ(nˆ1)]. In that case, mixing at nˆ0 only covers the
likelihood ratio range of [Φ (nˆ0) ,Φ(nˆ0 + 1)] and leaves the range (Φ (nˆ0 + 1) ,Φ(nˆ1)] uncovered. If
ϕˆ lies in the latter range, the classical mixed strategy extension cannot determine the equilibrium.
Proposition 1(ii) identifies a non-threshold strategy. Recall that Φ (Equation (10)) is a special
case of Ψ (Equation (6)). By continuity of Ψ ((nˆ0, α, nˆ1)) in α, any likelihood ratio in [Φ (nˆ0) ,Φ(nˆ1)]
is achieved with a mixed strategy, α ∈ [0, 1] at nˆ0 (as can be seen from the definitions). Hence,
there exists a randomization probability αˆ0 that ϕˆ is reached if it lies in (Φ (nˆ0 + 1) ,Φ(nˆ1)].
An Example of Sputtering Equilibrium: Now, we provide an illustrative example of a case
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when no threshold consumer joining equilibrium exists. Let vh = 2, v` = 0, p = 0.1, c = 0.051 and
µ = 1.05 and µ = 1.25. Let µ = µsf , that is: the high-quality server is slow while the low-quality
server is fast. In Figure 1, left panel, we illustrate Φ(nˆ(ϕ)). We indicate again the value of nˆ(ϕ) on
each horizontal segment where nˆ(ϕ) is constant. Notice that at ϕˆ = 0.5439, nˆ increases from nˆ0 = 6
to nˆ1 = 40. We obtain a non-threshold equilibrium with ϕˆ = 0.5439, nˆ0 = 6 and αˆ0 = 0.1170 and
nˆ1 = 40. This means that consumers always join the queue as long as its length is less than 6, they
join with probability 0.1170 when the queue length is 6, they always join when the queue length is
between 7 and 39, and they balk from any queue that is 40 or longer.
Now, we explain the intuition behind this result: Recall that ν(ϕ) is the set of real roots of
ϕ(µ`/µh)ν = L(ν). bν(ϕ)c determines the queue length at which rational consumers do not join,
assuming that ϕ is the likelihood ratio at the empty queue. On the left panel, we plot in dashed
lines the correspondence Φ(bν(ϕ)c), where for certain values of ϕ, ν (ϕ) can take three different
values. The values of bν(ϕ)c over the dashed branch are between 7 and 40. Recall also that
nˆ(ϕ) = bmin ν(ϕ)c, i.e. the lowest queue length at which a consumer balks. Hence, whenever
there are multiple solutions in ν(ϕ), the solution on the solid, top branch is selected. As a result,
the range of queue lengths between 7 and 39 is excluded from nˆ (ϕ), which ‘jumps’ from 6 to 40
(see Figure 1, left panel). As ϕˆ ∈ (Φ(7),Φ(40)], no classical threshold equilibrium can exist. This
can also be observed from the left panel of Figure 1 as the 45 degree line has no intersection with
Φ(nˆ(ϕ)). Thus, with Proposition 1(ii), a non-threshold equilibrium is identified with randomization
at a queue of length 6 and balking at a queue of length 40. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates
the equilibrium consumer updated utility (value and waiting cost). Indeed, there is one queue
length (6), at which the consumer is indifferent between joining and balking, while at queue length
40, the consumer balks.
Queue Dynamics: It is interesting to observe that a non-threshold equilibrium causes the fol-
lowing queue dynamics. As at nˆ0, consumers join the queue with a probability of less than one,
thus it will be difficult for the queue to grow beyond nˆ0. But, once the queue is larger than nˆ0, all
consumers join again with probability one. Hence, the server will observe that the queue ‘stalls’
from time to time at nˆ0. This is why we label this equilibrium as a ‘sputtering’ equilibrium. These
queue dynamics are an immediate result of the non-threshold consumer strategy. In the following
subsection, we discuss when this phenomenon occurs.
3.4 Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, we discuss some properties of the model. First, we derive a sufficient condition for
the classical threshold consumer joining equilibrium (Lemma 2). Next, we discuss the number of
possible equilibria (Lemma 3).
From the discussion in the previous section, it follows that it is important to assess when nˆ (ϕ)
increases in steps of +1, and when it has larger jumps. When (µh/µ`)
ν L (ν) is monotone in ν
and ν (ϕ) is a singleton, then, obviously, nˆ (ϕ) increases in steps of +1. In general, however,
(µh/µ`)
ν L (ν) is not always monotone in ν.
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ν (ϕ) can contain three solutions, as illustrated in Figure 1, left panel, where for a range of
values of ϕ two solutions are indicated by means of a dashed line and one solution (the lowest
value) by means of the solid line. The reason why there are three possible solutions could be
understood from the right panel of Figure 1: As the service value is bounded between v` and vh,
the updated service value after observing the queue length follows an S-shape for this particular
example: the updated value is bounded by vh and v` and at very low and very high queue lengths,
finding one extra consumer in the queue provides low additional evidence that the server is of high
quality. The updated waiting cost, on the other hand, is monotone increasing. As a result, there
may be three intersection points between the S-shaped updated value and the monotone increasing
updated cost. Hence, nˆ (ϕ) can increase in steps that are larger than +1 (in Figure 1, from 6 to 40
at ϕˆ = 0.5439). The following Lemma provides a sufficient condition for nˆ (ϕ) to be increasing in
steps of +1:
Lemma 2. When C (µ) > 0, where
C (µ) = c+
1
4
(µhvh − µ`v`) ln
(
µh
µ`
)
,
then, nˆ (ϕ) increases in steps of +1, otherwise, nˆ (ϕ) may increase in steps that are larger than +1.
It follows from Lemma 2 that C(µfs) = c+
1
4
(
µvh − µv`
)
ln
(
µ
µ
)
is strictly positive (as µvh >
µv` and µ/µ > 1) and, trivially, C(µss) = C(µff ) = c is strictly positive. This implies that
when the server’s service rate is independent of the server’s quality, or, when the highest quality
server is also the fastest server, threshold joining strategies always exist as the updated service
value is either independent of the queue length, or decreases in queue length, while the updated
service cost increases in the queue length. Only when the highest quality server is also the slowest
and both service value and cost increase in queue length (that is: service value and rate are
negatively correlated), a sputtering equilibrium may exist. As a consequence, if C(µsf ) = c +
1
4
(
µvh − µv`
)
ln
(
µ
µ
)
> 0, a classical threshold strategy is a consumer joining equilibrium for any
pure service rate strategy, µσ with σ ∈ {ss, ff, sf, fs}. In terms of the primitives of our model:
If the difference between the slow (µ) and the fast speed (µ) is not high, or, that the waiting
costs, c, are high enough, provided that the high quality server operating at a slow speed creates
more value per unit of service time than the low quality server operating at a fast service speed
(µvh > µv`), the consumer joining equilibrium is a classical threshold strategy for any service rate
strategy. Otherwise, a sputtering queue joining equilibrium may exist.
An Illustration of C(µ): The condition C (µ) = 0 is illustrated in Figure 2. The dashed lines
are µhvh = µ`v` and µh = µ`. Notice that C (µ) < 0 only when µhvh > µ`v` and µh < µ`, i.e.,
for a given service rate of the low quality server; when the service rate of the high quality server
is lower, but, not too low, it is possible that C (µ) < 0. C (µ) > 0 is a sufficient condition for
a threshold equilibrium strategy. When C (µ) > 0, we can analyze the properties of threshold
strategy equilibria, i.e. when αˆ0 = 0 or αˆ0 > 0 and nˆ1 = nˆ0 + 1. In Lemma 3, we characterize the
number of pure strategy joining equilibria:
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Non-threshold
Equilibrium may exist
Threshold Equilibrium always exists 
C(µ)<0
C(µ)>0
Figure 2: C (µ) = 0 for vh = 1.75, v` = 0.25 and c = 0.1051. The dashed lines are µhvh = µ`v`
and µh = µ`.
Lemma 3. When C (µ) > 0, then:
(i) When µh < µ`, there exists at most one pure strategy threshold equilibrium. If no pure strategy
equilibrium exists, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
(ii) When µ` ≤ µh, there exists at least one pure strategy threshold equilibrium. If more than one
pure strategy equilibrium exists, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is the following: Consider the situation when the high quality
server is the slowest server (σ = sf or µh < µ`); it is thus easily understood that the likelihood
ratio at the empty queue, Φ(nˆ), decreases in the joining threshold, nˆ.
Assume that nˆ is very low. The queue is mostly short. Hence, the recurrent state space (queue
lengths) is small such that the probability of observing an empty queue when the product quality
is high is not much different from the probability of observing an empty queue when the service
quality is low. Hence, Φ is comparable to one.
When nˆ is high, there is enough variation in the queue lengths such that there is a difference in
probability of observing an empty queue. In fact, the probability of observing an empty queue when
the quality is high will be lower than the probability of observing an empty queue when the quality
is low. Hence, Φ is less than one, and is thus decreasing in nˆ. As nˆ (ϕ) is always increasing in ϕ, it
follows that Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) decreases in ϕ. As a result, there can be at most one point of intersection for
Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) and the 45 degree line, and, therefore, at most one pure strategy equilibrium. For such
pure strategy equilibrium, ϕˆ < 1. When the low quality server is slow (σ = fs), the opposite is
true: Φ(nˆ) increases. As a result, there can be multiple points of intersection for Φ(nˆ (ϕ)) and the
45 degree line, and thus multiple pure strategy equilibria with ϕˆ > 1 may exist.
Recall from Section 3 that ϕˆ is the likelihood ratio at the empty queue, l (0), and we decomposed
the posterior belief that the quality is high via γ (n) / (1− γ (n)) = l0 × l (n). Hence, in any
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equilibrium in which the high-quality server is the slowest (σ = sf), as the equilibrium l (0) is less
than one, an empty queue is ‘bad news’ about the service quality (that is: γ (0) < p0). Longer
queues, however, make the consumer more confident that the quality is high (see Equation (9)).
When the low quality server is slow (σ = fs), the opposite is true: empty queues carry good news
about the quality (γ (0) > p0) and longer queues make the consumer less confident that the quality
is high.
4. Conclusions
In summary, combining Proposition 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3 yield the following conclusions.
1. When the high quality server is slow and the low quality server is fast, the updated value
from the service increases in the queue length. However, long queues also imply long waiting times.
Hence, both costs and value increase in queue length. When the difference between the service
rates of the high- and the low-quality server is small, there will exist a threshold, at which the
additional updated value does not compensate for the increase in the waiting costs. Consumers
balk from the queue at this threshold.
2. When the difference in service rates between different services is large enough, a “sputtering”
equilibrium involving randomization at some lower threshold emerges. Consumers are indifferent
between joining and balking at that threshold, while, at strictly longer and shorter queue lengths,
the consumers may strictly prefer joining the queue. Of course, as waiting costs grow without bound
in the queue length and the service value is finite, there will exist a second, higher threshold above
which no consumer ever joins. As a result, the queue generally resides at low lengths, and with
some probability (depending on the random decision of one consumer), grows to a larger queue,
since every one else joins at higher queue lengths.
To summarize, we find that the presence of informational uncertainty on service value and
service rate can introduce a sputtering queue joining equilibrium. Thus, a focus on simple threshold
policies in queuing games with uncertainty about the service rate and value might be restrictive.
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Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: We impose conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 for a given joining
profile α. We consider only strategy profiles of the following special form, parameterized by some
n = (n0, α0, n1): α(j) = 1 for 0 ≤ j < n0 and α(n0) = α0 and α(j) = 1 for n0 + 1 ≤ j < n1 and
α(j) = 0 for j ≥ n1 + 1. Then, we can rewrite with Equation (4) l (n) as:
l (0) = Ψ (n) and l (n) = l (0)
(
µ`
µh
)n
(for all n that are reached with positive probability on the long run). With Equations (3) and (5),
we can rewrite conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1 as:
(i)-consumers are rational when for each for all n that are reached with positive probability on the
long run, they join when
Ψ (n)
(
µ`
µh
)n
> (<)L (n)⇒ αˆ(n) = 1(0) and Ψ (n)
(
µ`
µh
)n
= L (n)⇒ αˆ(n) ∈ [0, 1]. (12)
(ii)-beliefs are consistent: The belief γˆ (n) satisfies Bayes’ rule when:
γˆ (n) =
Ψ (n)
(
µ`
µh
)n
Ψ(n)
(
µ`
µh
)n
+ 1
for n ≥ 0.
Hence, (1) the belief on the queue lengths that are reached with strictly positive probability on
the long run, γˆ (n) is completely specified by n and (2) for a given n, the rationality conditions
are completely determined. Equation (12) determines thus the equilibrium conditions nˆ, which
determine then αˆ.
Now, we introduce the variable ϕ > 0. In equilibrium, ϕˆ, will be equal to Ψ (nˆ). We replace Ψ (n)
in Equation (12) by ϕ and for any ϕ > 0, we define n0 is the lowest queue length at which the
consumer balks:
nˆ(ϕ) = min{n ∈ N : ϕ
(
µ`
µh
)n
≥ L (n) , for 0 ≤ n < n0 and ϕ
(
µ`
µh
)n
< L (n) , for n ≥ n0}.
Recall that we introduced
Φ (nˆ(ϕ)) = Ψ ((nˆ(ϕ), 0, ·)) .
The · indicates that Ψ ((nˆ0, 0, ·)) does not depend on n1. As nˆ(ϕ) ∈ N, nˆ(ϕ) is discontinuously
increasing in ϕ. Hence, Φ (nˆ(ϕ)) is a discontinuous function in ϕ. We can extend Φ (nˆ(ϕ)) to a
correspondence, Φˆ (nˆ(ϕ)), where at any discontinuous point ϕ′ of nˆ(ϕ), where nˆ(ϕ − ²) = n0 and
nˆ(ϕ+ ²) = n1 for an arbitrary small, but strictly positive ², the image of the correspondence is the
set [Φ (n0) ,Φ (n1)] if Φ (n0) < Φ(n1) or [Φ (n1) ,Φ(n0)] otherwise.
Existence of a fixed point of Φˆ (nˆ(ϕ)) = ϕ. Notice that ϕ = 0: nˆ(0) ≥ 0 for which Φˆ (nˆ(0)) > 0
and for ϕ→∞: nˆ(∞) ≤ ⌊vhµhc ⌋ <∞ for which Φˆ (nˆ(∞)) <∞. It follows that the correspondence
has at least one fixed point, ϕˆ, in (0,+∞). Next, we characterize a fixed point.
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Characterization of a fixed point of Φˆ (nˆ(ϕ)) = ϕ. We consider three cases:
Case 1. Assume that for some continuous point of nˆ(ϕ), ϕˆ, the corresponding nˆ0 = nˆ(ϕˆ) satisfies
ϕˆ = Φ(nˆ(ϕˆ))
Then, it is easy to see that the strategy profile αˆ, defined by αˆ(j) = 1 for 0 ≤ j < nˆ0 and αˆ(nˆ0) = 0
satisfies (i) of Definition 1, by construction of nˆ(ϕ) (as nˆ0 is the lowest queue length at which the
consumer balks, the consumer joins for all queue lengths strictly lower than nˆ0, as is assumed in the
special structure of α) and also (ii) of Definition 1 because ϕˆ = l(0). Hence, αˆ satisfies conditions
(i) and (ii) of Definition 1.
Case 2. Assume that no continuous point of nˆ(ϕ) exists for which the above fixed point equality
is satisfied. As the correspondence Φˆ (nˆ(ϕ)), there must exist at least one discontinuous point, ϕˆ,
that satisfies Φˆ (nˆ(ϕˆ)) = ϕˆ. Now, let nˆ0 = nˆ(ϕˆ− ²) and assume that nˆ(ϕˆ+ ²) = nˆ0+1 then: either
Φ (nˆ0) > ϕˆ > Φ(nˆ0 + 1) or Φ (nˆ0) < ϕˆ < Φ(nˆ0 + 1) (13)
Now consider α(j) = 1 for 0 ≤ j < n0 and α(n0) = α0 and α(j) = 0 for j ≥ n0+1. Then, condition
(ii) for consistent beliefs becomes:
ϕˆ = Ψ((nˆ0 + 1, α0, nˆ0 + 1)) .
From continuity of the right hand side of the above expression in α0, which ranges from Φ (nˆ0)
(for α0 = 0) to Φ (nˆ0 + 1) (for α0 = 1) and by the inequalities (13) it follows that there must
exist a αˆ0 such that the rationality condition at the empty queue needs to be satisfied: ϕˆ =
Ψ((nˆ0 + 1, αˆ0, nˆ0 + 1)). Then, it is easy to see that the strategy profile αˆ, defined by αˆ(j) = 1 for
0 ≤ j < nˆ0, αˆ(nˆ0) = αˆ0 and αˆ(j) = 0 for j ≥ nˆ0 + 1 satisfies (i) of Definition 1, by construction
of nˆ(ϕ) and also (ii) of Definition 1 because ϕˆ = l(0). Hence, αˆ satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of
Definition 1.
Case 3. Assume again that no continuous point of nˆ(ϕ) exists for which the above fixed point
equality is satisfied. Now, assume that nˆ(ϕˆ+ ²) = nˆ1 > nˆ0 + 1. Then, either:
Φ (nˆ0) > ϕˆ > Φ(nˆ1) or Φ (nˆ0) < ϕˆ < Φ(nˆ1) . (14)
Similarly as in Case 2., consider α(j) = 1 for 0 ≤ j < n0 and α(n0) = α0 and introduce α(j) = 1
for n0 + 1 ≤ j < n1 and α(j) = 0 for j ≥ n1 + 1. Notice that by definition of Ψ (Equation 6) for
nˆ1 = nˆ(ϕ+ ²) > nˆ0 + 1:
Φ (nˆ0) = Ψ ((nˆ0, 0, nˆ1)) and Φ (nˆ1) = Ψ ((nˆ0, 1, nˆ1)) .
From continuity of Ψ ((nˆ0, α0, nˆ1)) in α0, and by the inequalities (14) it follows that there must
exist a αˆ0 such that the rationality condition at the empty queue needs to be satisfied: ϕˆ =
Ψ((nˆ0, αˆ0, nˆ1)). Again, it is easy to see that the strategy profile αˆ, defined by αˆ(j) = 1 for
0 ≤ j < n0 and αˆ(n0) = αˆ0 and αˆ(j) = 1 for n0 + 1 ≤ j < n1 and αˆ(j) = 0 for j ≥ n1 + 1 satisfies
(i) of Definition 1 (by construction of nˆ(ϕ)) and (ii) of Definition 1 (because ϕˆ = l(0)). Hence, αˆ
satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 1.
Case 1, Case 2 and Case 3 result in Equations (6), (7), (8) and (9).
Proof of Lemma 2: Define:
ϕ (ν) .=
{ (
µh
µ`
)ν
L (ν) for ν ∈ [ν`, νh − 1)
+∞ for ν ≥ νh − 1,
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Where νω = vωµω/c. ϕ (n) is the likelihood ratio upon observing an empty queue that will make
the consumer indifferent between joining a queue of length n and balking, assuming that at queue
lengths 0 to n, all consumers join and informed consumers only join when the server is of high
quality, i.e. when nˆ (ϕ′) = n′, then ϕ (n′) = ϕ′. When ϕ (n) is increasing in n, this means that as
ϕ increases, nˆ (ϕ) increases in increments of 1. When ϕ (n) is not monotone, this means that nˆ (ϕ)
increases in increments of potentially more than 1. In order to establish this, we consider ν as a
continuous variable and derive ϕ (ν). We find that over [ν`, νh − 1), the derivative can have zero
or two zero points. We ignore the knife-edge case of one degenerate zero point. Let νand νbe the
zero points of ddνϕ (ν). It can easily be established that
d
dνϕ (0) > 0, hence, ϕ (ν) increases first,
reaches a local maximum and then decreases to a local minimum, after which it increases again.
It can also be established easily that limν→νh−1 ϕ (ν) = +∞. As a result, over [ν, ν], where ϕ (ν)
decreases, nˆ (ϕ) may increase in jumps that are larger than 1. Now, we take the derivative:
d
dν
ϕ (ν) =
 v` − vh(vh − cν+1µh )2
c
µh
+
−v` + cν+1µ`
vh − cν+1µ`
ln
(
µh
µ`
) 1l0
(
µh
µ`
)ν
Hence, it follows that
d
dν
ϕ (ν) > 0⇔
c 1µ`
(
vh − cν+1µh
)
+
(
−v` + cν+1µ`
)(
c 1µh
)
(
vh − cν+1µh
)2 + −v` + cν+1µ`vh − cν+1µh
(
ln
(
µh
µ`
))
> 0⇔
c
µ`
+
(
−v` + cν+1µ`
)
(
vh − cν+1µh
) c
µh
+
(
−v` + cν + 1
µ`
)
ln
(
µh
µ`
)
> 0⇔
c
µhvh − µ`v`
µhµ`
+
(
c
ν + 1
µ`
− v`
)(
vh − cν + 1
µh
)
ln
(
µh
µ`
)
> 0
⇒ − ln
(
µh
µ`
)(
c
ν + 1
µ`
− v`
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
vh − cν + 1
µh
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
< c
µhvh − µ`v`
µhµ`
. (15)
This is a quadratic equation in ν. Hence, ddνϕ (ν) = 0 has zero, or two real solutions, depending on
the parameters. Notice that the left hand side reaches a maximum when
d
dν
((
−v` + cν + 1
µ`
)(
vh − cν + 1
µh
))
= 0⇔ ν∗ = −1 + µhvh + µ`v`
2c
v` − cν
∗ + 1
µ`
< 0 < vh − cν
∗ + 1
µh
⇔ −1
2
µhvh − µ`v`
µ`
< 0 <
1
2
µhvh − µ`v`
µh
and as a result, assuming that µhvh − µ`v` > 0 is always satisfied because in the worst case,
µvh > µv` (all other cases are trivially satisfied), ν∗ lies in between ν`and νh − 1. Thus, we can
write: (
−v` + cν + 1
µ`
)(
vh − cν + 1
µh
)
≤ 1
4
(µhvh − µ`v`)2
µhµ`
(16)
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Plugging Equation (16) in Equation (15), we obtain that:
c
µhvh − µ`v`
µhµ`
> −1
4
(µhvh − µ`v`)2
µhµ`
ln
(
µh
µ`
)
⇒ d
dν
ϕ (ν) > 0,∀ν ∈ [ν`, νh − 1]
or
C (µ) = c+
1
4
(µhvh − µ`v`) ln
(
µh
µ`
)
> 0⇒ d
dν
ϕ (ν) > 0, ∀ν ∈ [ν`, νh − 1] .
We have thus proven that when C (µ) > 0, ϕ (ν) is increasing. Hence nˆ (ϕ) increases in jumps
of one. When C (µ) < 0, there exist two roots of Equation (15), νand ν. ϕ (ν) is decreasing in
between the two roots, which implies that nˆ (ϕ) will never take values over (ν, ν). Hence nˆ (ϕ)
may increase in jumps that are larger than one. Notice that when µhµ` > 1, C (µ) > 0. Only when
µh
µ`
< 1, we may obtain that C (µ) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 3: First, we write Φ (ν) as follows:
Φ (ν) =
∑ν
n=0
[
Λ
µ`
]n
∑ν
n=0
[
Λ
µh
]n = (1−
[
Λ
µ`
]ν+1
1− Λµ`
)/(
1−
[
Λ
µh
]ν+1
1− Λµh
)
We show that Φ (ν) increases in ν iff µ` < µh. Now, we consider ν as a continuous variable and
determine the condition when Φ (ν) is increasing:
1− Λµh
1− Λµ`
d
dν
(
1−
[
Λ
µ`
]ν+1)
d
dν
(
1−
[
Λ
µh
]ν+1) > Φ(ν)⇔ 1− Λµh1− Λµ`
d
dν
([
Λ
µ`
]ν+1)
d
dν
([
Λ
µh
]ν+1) > Φ(ν)
as ddν
(
aν+1
)
= aν+1 ln a, we obtain that
d
dν
Φ(ν) > 0⇔
(
µh
µ`
)ν+1 1− Λµh
1− Λµ`
ln
(
Λ
µ`
)
ln
(
Λ
µh
) > 1− Λµh
1− Λµ`
1−
[
Λ
µ`
]ν+1
1−
[
Λ
µh
]ν+1 or:
d
dν
Φ(ν) > 0⇔
(
Λ
µ`
)ν+1 ln( Λµ`)
1−
[
Λ
µ`
]ν+1 > ( Λµh
)ν+1 ln( Λµh)
1−
[
Λ
µh
]ν+1 (17)
Now, consider
xν+1
ln (x)
1− xν+1
and let z = xν+1, then notice
z
ln
(
z
1
ν+1
)
1− z =
1
ν + 1
z
ln (z)
1− z
and as z ln(z)1−z < 0 and continous decreasing for z > 0. Hence, the condition of Equation (17) is
satisfied iff Λµ` >
Λ
µh
or µh > µ`, then ddνΦ(ν) > 0, otherwise
d
dνΦ(ν) < 0.
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